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Abstract
Motivated by high and rising sex ratios in countries such as India and China, we formulate a
theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of economic development on parental sex choice
when sons are culturally prized and children provide old age support. Two key assumptions
drive our model. First, the cultural valuation of children vary not only with gender but also with
marital status. In particular, while a married son is preferred to a married daughter, the latter
is preferred to an unmarried son. Second, we assume that faced with a shortage of brides, poor
parents will have a harder time marrying their sons than rich parents. Our model predicts male
sex ratios at low levels of development, where the surplus sons are chosen by the poorest who
forego grand-children for old age support. With development, incomes and the bride price rise,
allowing the poorest reproductive children. Consequently, sex ratios fall, and the relationship
between parental income and offspring maleness turns positive. We also present corroborative
evidence from South Korea, a now developed country which shares with India and China a
strong patriarchal culture and a recent past of poverty.
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1 Introduction
The arrival of prenatal sex determination in the early 1980s combined with age old preference for
sons have resulted in unnaturally high sex ratios (males to females) in a number of Asian countries,
notably India [Miller, 1981, Das Gupta, 1987] and China [Banister, 1987, Zeng et al., 1993, Tul-
japurkar et al., 1995, Scharping, 2003], where for the latter, the 2000 census returned a sex ratios at
birth of 120 boys per 100 girls, and level that remained unchanged in the 2005 inter-census, leaving
China with an estimated 25 million more males than females under age 20.1 The corresponding
figure for India may be in the vicinity of 20 million.2
This development has provoked a number of questions as to the motives underlying this proclivity
to choose sons and, and by extention, whether this practice will continue in the face of inter alia
a mounting surplus of males, moral suasion, and economic development (see e.g., Li et al. [2000],
Chung and Das Gupta [2007], Almond and Edlund [2008], Lipatov et al. [2008], Almond et al. [2009]).
This paper proposes a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of economic development
on parental sex choice under son preference and non-random matching on the marriage market.
Children, we propose, provide two types of benefits to parents, psychic utility and material support
in old age, where the latter is gender neutral: a dollar is a dollar irrespective of whether from a
son or a daughter. In contrast, sons are assumed to only deliver higher psychic utility conditional
on marital status. That is, a married son yields higher psychic utility than a married daughter,
but a married daughter is preferred to an unmarried son ceteris paribus. This second inequality is
important but we believe realistic. For instance, the Confucian value of a son is closely linked to
his having sons, suggesting the value of children who have children.3 While we are not the first to
note that the cultural value of a son may depend on his marital status [Lipatov et al., 2008], the
assumption of non-random mating has additional implications for the sex ratio in the cross section.
Our model predicts that when society is poor, the poor in that society may choose sons to support
them in old age although these sons would not be able to marry – the aggregate implication of which
is a surplus of sons. As society grows richer, even the poor may afford themselves married children.
The reason is two-fold. First, the additional consumption afforded by an unmarried son may seem
1Zhu et al. [2009] states 32 million, but that seems to be from assuming that the sample is 1% instead of 1.3%,
pointed out by Avi Ebenstein.
2Sex ratios in the Indian 2001 census was reported to be 1.09 for the ages 0-14, which translates into 15 million
more boys than girls below age 15, or roughly one million surplus males for each single-year cohort.
3If unmarried sons yielded higher psychic utility than married daughters, everybody would be better off with sons
only, and the population would rapidly vanish.
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less worthwhile at higher incomes, rendering a married daughter (grand-children) more appealing.
Second, a richer society can sustain a higher bride price, reducing (or even reversing) the economic
disadvantage of daughters. If so, as a society grows richer, the poor may choose daughters who
marry over sons who do not, resulting in a decline in the aggregate sex ratio. Thus, the substitution
of daughters for sons among lower class parents, in turn, allows for the converse substitution among
the upper class, resulting in the relation between parental status and maleness of offspring to go
from u-shaped to positive as society grows richer.
Explicitly allowing for parents to care about consumption and thus the earnings ability of their
children (net of marriage transfers, if any) provides a framework for analyzing the impact of devel-
opment without positing that development acts on the cultural motives for son preference, although
that is of course a possibility [Lipatov et al., 2008]. Economic development, in our model, directly
influences choices by lowering the valuation of consumption at the margin, which lowers parental
valuation of higher earnings potential of sons over daughters, and raises the willingness to pay to
have a married son. The higher bride price further contributes to making a married daughter a more
attractive option compared to an unmarried son.
We also present corroborative evidence from Korea, a country which shares with India and
China a strong tradition of favoring sons and rising sex ratios at birth following the introduction of
sonography in the early 1980s.4 Importantly, however, excess female mortality predates the 1980s,
which combined with rapidly falling fertility resulted in a noticeable shortage of brides already in
the 1990s, a period of relative aﬄuence thanks to two decades of rapid growth – per capita income
in 2000 US dollars rose from $873 in 1970 to $11,675 in 1995, and in 1996, Korea joined the OECD.
Thus, Korea offers an attractive case study for our model’s predictions for sex-choice under son
preference and economic development.
To start with the overall sex ratio at birth, the introduction of ultrasound sex determination in
the early 1980s resulted in rising sex ratios at birth and in 1993, 117 boys per 100 girls where born.
However, sex ratios have actually declined since and are now normal, see Figure A-1.5 The decline
supports our model’s prediction that in a rich society parents choose married children (of either
gender) over non-reproductives (sons by virtue of higher male than female productivity) for old age
support. (The initial rise is likely linked to the arrival of ultrasound screening.)
4A weekly popular magazine reported the cost of sex determination through ultrasound in 1984 at 60,000 won
(USD 75) [Park and Cho, 1995].
5In 2007 the sex ratio at birth was 106.1. Korea National Statistics Office, 2007 Annual Report on Live Births
and Death Statistics.
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Moreover, in line with our model’s predictions, we document a changing relationship between
parental socio-economic status and maleness of offspring. Using the 2005 census, and focussing on
women with completed fertility (45 years of age or older), we find that for cohorts born 1931-40,
the least educated mothers report the highest sex ratios, 1.10 (sons to daughters), and the sex ratio
falls monotonically with maternal education to the biologically normal 1.05 for mothers with college
education. This relationship remains negative for the next ten-year cohort, born 1941-50, albeit
substantially flatter. However, for the last cohorts with completed fertility, those born in 1951-60,
the relationship was reversed: the least educated had borne 1.04 sons per daughter while mothers
with a college degree or more had borne 1.12 sons per daughter.
Correlates of cross-county variation in sex ratios using the 2005 Korean Vital statistics provide
further evidence of parental sex choice decisions being influenced at least in part by marriage market
considerations. Poor counties, or counties with a high sex ratio among adults 20-29 (prime marriage
years, see footnote 9), exhibit lower sex ratios at birth suggesting that current marriage market
conditions may impact the decision of whether to have a girl or a boy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We conclude this section by providing a brief
literature review and background describing the Korean marriage market, institutions for old age
support. Section 2 presents our model of parental sex choice. Section 3 our evidence from Korea
and Section 4 concludes.
1.1 Literature Review
This paper’s model builds on Edlund [1999], whose main prediction of positive relation between
parental status and maleness of offspring coincided with that of Trivers and Willard [1973]. These
studies focus exclusively on children’s reproductive success. By contrast, numerous studies routinely
assume that son’s greater earnings ability is a sufficient reason for parents to prefer sons. Allowing
for both motives to matter may be important for understanding future developments in countries
such as India and China.
Somewhat ironically, the modeling of the cultural component of son preference, and its trans-
mission across generations has been done outside the social sciences. In Li et al. [2000], the son
preference is transferred through inheritance (vertically) or from society (obliquely), where the rate
of transmission is governed by exogenous transmission parameters. In Lipatov et al. [2008] economic
development impacts the cultural preference by effects on the earnings advantage of males. The
marriage market feeds back into the cultural value attached to sons because it is assumed that peo-
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ple who prefer sons also choose more sons. Consequently, if mating is random and fertility constant,
mothers whose parents had a son preference are under-represented in the next generation. Clearly,
the assumptions that preferences and choices coincide, and that mating is random is different from
this papers model that traces out aggregate and cross-sectional implications for the sex ratio as a
society develops without assuming that development acts on the cultural valuation of sons. Indeed,
high sex ratios among South and East Asian immigrants to the UK and North America suggest
that such cultural biases may persist in developed societies [Dubuc and Coleman, 2007, Almond and
Edlund, 2008, Abrevaya, 2009, Almond et al., 2009].
Kim [2005] focussed on the effect of sex selective abortion on fertility and sex ratios. Using
detailed information on fertility history, including abortions and their timing, from the Korean
National Fertility and Family Surveys, 1988 and 1991, and information on the number of ultrasound
machines in a region, estimated that better access would lower fertility and raise the sex ratio.
Chung and Das Gupta [2007] analyzed the Korea National Fertility and Family Health Surveys
(various years). These surveys include questions about about son preference. They found that
between 1985 and 2003, there was a marked decline in the fraction of women reporting “must have a
son.” Whether this result reflects a change in underlying preference or an internalization of marriage
market constraints is debatable.
1.2 Demographic Background Korea
Normally, there are about 1.05:1 boys to girls at birth, and the sex ratio then declines to balance
around age 20.6 Figure 1 plots the population by age and gender in 2009. As can be seen, men
outnumber women until age 55, indicating excess female mortality predating ultrasound screening
[Goodkind, 1996]. This is not to say ultrasound had no impact. The male surplus is larger for the
younger cohorts, especially those who were born in the late 1980s, early 1990s, some ten plus years
following the introduction of the technology. This is further illustrated in Figure 2 which plots the
sex ratio by age.
What is also evident from Figure 1 is a marked slowdown in fertility, which has further exacer-
bated the marriage squeeze facing Korean men, who on average marry women three years younger
than themselves.7 The total fertility rate went from 6 in the 1960s, to 4.5 in 1970 to below replace-
6The crossing-over normally happen around age 20. For instance, the US 1980 census returned 10,663 thousand
males to 10,655 thousand females in the age group 20-24. Later censuses return slightly later crossing over points, a
fact we suspect is driven by immigration.
7This age gap has been quite stable since 1990.
5
ment level in the early 1980s, and is now one of the lowest in the world at some 1.2 children per
woman.8 Cohort sizes halved in the last three decades and thus “surplus” men born in say 1980
seeking brides from the 1983 cohort face a sex ratio of 1.24, or a deficit of some 80,000 women, see
Figure 3.
Figure 4 presents the gender gap among singles by age for the years 1985, 1995 and 2005 (drawn
form the micro samples of the censuses). Since men marry women on average three years younger
than themselves, at young ages, men outnumber women among the unmarried. As men move into
prime marriage ages (and women out), the gap dwindles to eventually turn negative. In 1985, the
number of single men and women balanced by age 34. In 1995, parity is only reached at age 38
and in 2005, this age had been further pushed back to 44 – a change by 11 years despite the age at
marriage only having moved by 3 years over the period.9
The deficit of women of marriageable age has visibly impacted marriage patterns. While in 1981,
men were almost three times as likely to remarry as women, by the mid-90s, women had overtaken
men, and in 2005 there were 1.5 more marriages between a remarrying bride and never-married
groom, than the reverse combination, Figure 5.10 Lately, Korean men unable to marry nationals
have turned to poorer Asian countries for brides – the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia and China
being major source countries. In 2006, 9 percent of marriages involved a foreign bride, up from less
than one percent in 1990, and among men in agriculture or fishery, low status occupational groups, 41
percent of grooms married foreign women.11 Although Korea’s economic development has afforded
even its poorest men brides, such foreign marriages have been warily received by a culturally and
ethically homogenous society.12 Add to the public opprobrium marital strife stemming from short
courtship and divergent expectations.
Bride price and old age support
In Korea, traditionally it is the groom’s (or his parents’) responsibility to provide housing for
the newly-weds. In the case of the oldest son, this residence would be shared with his parents, an
important form of old age support. Parents of daughters would see their daughters being provided
8TFR was 1.08 in 2005; 1.13 in 2006; 1.26 in 2007 (Korea National Statistics Office, 2007 Annual Report on Live
Births and Death Statistics).
9Male and female average age at first marriage was 27.8 and 24.8 respectively in 1990 and 31.1 and 28.1 in 2007.
10As a comparison, the fraction of marriages where it is the bride’s first marriage but the groom’s second or higher
marriage was slightly lower than the reverse combination in the US, Statistical Abstract, 2000, table 145, covering
the years 1970 to 1988.
11Vital Statistics of Korea, Marriage and Divorce.
12The topic of numerous news paper articles, for instance, “Korean Men Use Brokers to Find Brides in Vietnam,”
The New York Times, February 22, 2007.
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for, but would not benefit from co-residence with prime aged adults. Thus, while the tradition
implies an implicit bride price, it leaves parents of daughters at a disadvantage, a common feature
of pre-industrial patriarchal societies [Das Gupta et al., 2003].
Over the last several decades, the advantage of sons over daughters became weaker as public
old-age pension system was introduced and traditional social norms were gradually replaced by
the Western-style individualism.13 For instance, the extended family has given way to the nuclear
reflected in a decline in co-residence with old-age parents and other forms of old-age support from
child to parent (such as transfers). While these changes applied across the board, they may have
been more important for the poor who relied more heavily on their sons for old age support.
Figure A-2 (in Appendix) graphs the percent of elderly being primarily supported by their sons
for support by education between 1994 and 2006. Two facts stand out. First, the less educated are
more reliant on sons. In 1994, 70% of those with only primary education relied on sons, whereas
the corresponding figure for those with a college education was slightly less than 40%. Second, in
the relatively short period 1994-2006, there has been almost a halving in the reliance on sons, from
close to 50% in 1994 to 27% in 2006.
2 Model
We model parental sex choice under son preference where parents care about grand-children and old-
age support, children’s spouses are allocated on monogamous, two-sided marriage market with an
endogenous bride-price. We are particularly interested in the role of development for the population
sex ratio and who, in the cross section, chooses sons and daughters respectively.
Key Assumptions
1. Sons are more productive than daughters.
2. Grand-children through sons are more valued than grand-children through daughters.
3. Grand-children through daughters are better than no grand-children.
Assumption 1 together with positive valuation of grand-children means that the bride price paid
by groom parent to bride parent must be positive. Assumption 1 also means that no equilibria
13The original old-age pension law was passed in 1973, although its implementation was postponed due to the oil
crisis. The National Pension System was finally created in 1988 based on a new law passed in 1986, and its coverage
expanded over the 1990s.
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can have unmarried daughters (if a child remains unmarried, that child would yield higher utility
to its parents if male, since more productive). Assumption 2 is in keeping with Confucian tradi-
tion. Assumption 3 is based on the evolutionary argument that an all male society is a short lived
proposition, and therefore the empirically relevant cases are those which allow for daughters.
While economic development may affect the extent to which sons are better providers of old age
support than daughters (e.g., lower labor market gender pay gap, emancipation of adult children),
we will abstract from that channel to focus on how higher income affects the valuation of grand-
children: the standard assumption of decreasing marginal utility of consumption imply that as a
society grows richer, parents’ willingness to trade consumption for grand children increases.
These simple assumptions will deliver a model where as a society grows richer:
1. The sex ratio declines and asymptotes to 50/50.
2. The cross-sectional relationship between sex ratios and parental SES goes from u-shaped to
positive.
2.1 Set Up
We assume a large, two-sex, population. Marriage is assumed heterosexual and monogamous, and
short hands for children. The marriage market clears with the help of a bride price t. For simplicity,
we assume that each married couple has one child.14 Parents decide offspring sex and whether the
child marries. Again for simplicity, we assume that the technology that governs offspring sex is
perfect and costless. We will treat the parent couple as a single decision unit and for expositional
ease we will refer to it as the parent.
Parents are indexed by i where i is continuous and uniformly distributed on the unit interval,
where parent i’s income is a continuous, increasing, function of i, yi > yj , for i > j. We assume
that a child yields two types of benefits to parents: psychic and material (e.g., old age support). We
assume utility to be given by the following function,
u(gm, c) = γgm + f(c) (1)
14This is purely for expositional purposes. An earlier version of the paper assumed two children, which allowed for
couples to choose one son and one daughter. Three children would allow for yet more finely granulated outcomes, etc.
However, the qualitative flavor of the model would not change. In Section 3 we will consider the case of laxer fertility
restrictions.
8
where gm, indicates the gender (g = S - son, g = D - daughter) of the child and its marital status
(m = 0 - unmarried, m = 1 - married), γgm denotes the psychic utility from a child of gender g and
marital status m, and f(c), f ′(c) > 0, f ′′(c) < 0, c ≥ 0, is the utility derived from consumption c.
Consumption depends on exogenous income y(i) and the gender and marital status of children.15
For simplicity, we assume that sons earn δ and daughters zero. A daughter, however, commands a
bride price t > 0 (from assumptions 1 and 2, for a parent to choose a daughter, the bride price must
be positive).16 For simplicity, we assume that women are homogenous as brides, so that the bride
price is unique (and set by marginal man’s willingness to pay for marriage).
Unmarried children are always feasible, and from assumption 1 it follows that an unmarried
daughter is dominated by an unmarried son. Therefore, the relevant offspring choices are:
S0, D1 and S1.
For notational ease, let the psychic rewards from the above offspring choices be denoted by
γj , j = 0, 1, 2 respectively, and let that of one unmarried sons, γ0, be normalized to 0. From
assumptions 1-3, and the normalization, it follows that:
0 = γ0 < γ1 < γ2.
Choices over the child’s gender and marital status are made given income, the bride-price, pro-
ductivity of the child and the restriction that consumption is positive.
Equilibrium The bride price t:
1. clears the marriage market; and
2. no parent would obtain a higher utility from a child gender and marital status choice than
that chosen.
Definition We will say that society A is richer than society B (and that B is poorer than A) if
yAi > y
B
i , ∀i ∈ [0, 1], where the superscript indicates the society.
We will also use the terms richer and developed synonymously when referring to a society.
15This could be because the parent own the child’s income and are responsible for marriage market payments.
Alternatively, the parent cares about the earnings power of its child, net of marriage market transfers. In the latter
case, one could allow incomes and marriage expenditures to enter as a separate term in utility function, but we opt
for the, for our purposes, innocuous but simplifying assumption that parents own their children.
16For practical purposes, we note that females can produce socially recognized offspring on their own, while males
cannot. Men obtain social fatherhood through marriage, for examples see, e.g., Edlund and Korn [2002].
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Proposition 1 1. Equilibria can be described as follows:
i ∈ [0, i1) choose S0,
i ∈ [i1, i2) choose D1,
i ∈ [i2, 1] choose S1.
where 0 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 and 0 < i2 < 1.
2. The bride price is positive and makes up at least half of the productivity difference between a
son and a daughter.
3. The bride price is higher in a richer society.
Higher bride price implies that (married) daughters become more attractive relative to sons
(married or unmarried).
4. If 0 = i1 characterizes the equilibrium for a society, then equilibria for richer societies are also
thus characterized.
That is, if all couples choose children who marries, this would be true in richer societies as
well.
5. If i1 > 0 in a society, then i1 > 0 in poorer societies.
That is, if a society has parents choosing unmarried sons, then poorer societies would as well.
Corollary 1 As a society grows richer:
1. The sex ratio declines until it reaches unity and then stays balanced.
2. A u-shaped relationship between maleness of offspring and parental status gives way to a positive
relationship.
Corollary 1 is illustrated in Appendix Figure A-3. Proof:
Intuitively, to see that 0 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 < 1, note that the associated choices give successively higher
psychic utility and thus must be more expensive (and therefore chosen by successively richer parents).




Otherwise, a married son, S1, would yield higher monetary returns than a married daughter,
D1, and everybody would choose married sons, an impossibility in equilibrium.
There are two cases to consider: δ/2 < t < δ and t ≥ δ.
Equilibria, t ≥ δ. t ≥ δ is a sufficient condition for a married daughter, D1, to dominate an
unmarried son, S0. Consequently, everybody chooses married children, and i1 = i2 = 0.
Moreover, in this case, sex ratios must balance, that is i2 = 0.5
To see that an endogenous bride price t > δ results in a balanced sex ratio, note that if there
were too many sons, i2 < 0.5, there would be upward pressure on the bride price, which would
raise i2. Conversely, if there were too many daughters, i2 > 0.5, downward pressure on the
bride price would lower i2, a process that would continue until i2 = 0.5 (assuming that y0.5
supports a bride price greater than δ).
That i > 0.5 choose sons and i < 0.5 choose daughters follows from the standard assumption
that consumption enters concavely in the utility function and that yi > yj , for i > j (while
the psychic utility difference between a married son and a married daughter does not). These
assumptions also drive the result that, comparing societies, if one society is richer, its bride
price would also be higher (point 3).
Equilibria, δ/2 < t < δ. In this case, another type of equilibrium is possible: i1 > 0 and i2 = i1+12 .
That is, the bride price does not make up for the productivity difference between a son a
daughter. An unmarried son yields higher monetary return than a married daughter and
therefore parents may chose to have sons who do not marry. That these parents would be the
poorest follows from the same logic underpinning why the poorer half choose daughters and
the richer half sons in the above case: the lower psychic utility is offset by higher consumption,
the utility value of which is highest for the poor.
A necessary condition for this type of equilibria is that the bride price is sufficiently low, that
is, the unmarried son choice S0 requires not only that the poor are poor, but that society is
also poor, rendering the bride price too low to ensure a balanced sex ratio.
For i1 > 0 we need that
f(yi + δ) > f(yi + t) + γ1 ⇒
f(yi + δ)− f(yi + t) > γ1,
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which clearly can hold for large enough productivity differences between men and women,
low enough bride price, low enough valuation of grandchildren from daughters (relative to no
grand-children), or some combination of the above.
q.e.d.
2.2 Model Discussion
The model predicts that high status parents always choose sons. Low status parents may choose
sons. When a society is poor, the bride price and own income is insufficient to make low status
parents prefer reproductive children (grand-children) over non-reproductive children, and therefore
they opt for sons (the more productive sex), and sex ratios are male. If the non-reproductive bottom
is large relative to the top, then the relationship between sex ratios and parental status may appear
negative. In a rich society, even low status parents may be able to afford grand-children and thus
low status parents may choose daughters over non-reproductive sons. Married daughters instead
of unmarried sons could be chosen by low status parents either because they have sufficiently high
income themselves, or because of a high bride price (that is, higher status parents are sufficiently
rich). In this case, population sex ratios balance, the bottom is female, and there is a positive
relationship between maleness of offspring and parental status.
Thus our model can account for the decline in the sex ratio seen since the mid 1990s. It does not
account for the increase in the sex ratio between 1980-1995, but that increase may be the result of
technology diffusion and the fact that early cohorts (with respect to ultrasound) have a “first mover”
advantage (since a high sex ratio in their cohort could “force” younger cohorts to more female).
The model elucidates that scarcity of brides does not guarantee that the bride price equalizes the
economic returns from sons and daughters, a common feature of poor patriarchal societies [Chung
and Das Gupta, 2007]. For that, society needs to be sufficiently rich.
3 Sex Ratios in Korea
We now proceed to present some evidence from Korea, where rapid economic growth and develop-
ment of social insurance programs since the 1970s should have diminished the value of sons as a
means of old-age security; and a deficit of women among young adults became noticeable already in
the early 1990s (stemming from sex selection predating ultrasound technology).
12
According to the model developed above, such changes in incomes and marriage market should
have transformed the relationship between parental status and maleness of offspring. The model also
predicts that parents, poor parents in particular, would be less likely to choose sons if anticipated
marriage market conditions for sons are less favorable.
In the balance of this section, we offer some empirical evidence drawn from Korea in support of
these conjectures.
3.1 Changes Across Cohorts
To examine the long-term changes in the maleness of children and parental status, the offspring
sex ratio by mother’s education is estimated for the three different birth cohorts (those born in
1931-1940, 1941-1950, and 1951-60) who had passed child-bearing age (45 and older) by 2005. For
the computation, we use a 2% micro random sample of the 2005 Population and Housing Census
(Census, hereafter). Of the six Censuses taken from 1980 to 2005, for which micro random samples
are currently available, only the 2005 census provides information on the number of all children ever
born by sex, including the children who were dead and those who were not present in the household
at the time of the census enumeration. Thus, this source is free from potential bias arising from
selective death and leaving home of children that other Censuses are subject to.17 Another advantage
of this Census is that religions of respondents are reported. A weakness of estimating the offspring
sex ratios of multiple cohorts from a single-year census is that only the children of surviving mothers
are counted. However, if the mortality of mothers is not strongly correlated with the gender of their
children, which is likely, such a survivorship bias should be small.
The sample used in the estimation is limited to women who had completed child-bearing for the
following reasons. First, more educated women tend to have children at older age than less educated
women in Korean, as in many other developed countries. Second, son preference is more strongly
17Infant and child mortality would typically be higher in poorer families than in richer ones. If boys are weaker than
girls, as is widely known to be the case, an increase in child mortality means more deaths of sons than of daughters.
For this reason, the sex ratio of living children is likely to understate the true sex ratio; and such a downward bias
should be larger for poorer families. It is likely that children of poorer parents leave home at a younger age than
aﬄuent children. Prior to the 1980s, teenage children of many poor families in Korea, especially those in rural areas,
left home to be employed as factory operatives or domestic servants. The direction of bias in the sex ratio in this case
depends on whether children of a particular sex were more likely to leave home earlier, which is unclear. If daughters
tend to leave home earlier than sons, for example, the sex ratio of children living with parents would overstate the
true sex ratio; and this upward bias would be greater for poorer families than for richer families.
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revealed for higher-parity births.18 This means that highly-educated women would be more likely
to have a son at a relatively older age than the low-educated. Thus, if younger mothers still at
child-bearing ages were included in the analysis, the offspring sex ratio of high-education women
could be underestimated compared to that of less educated females.
The results reported in Figure 6 report sex ratios by maternal education for the three successive
ten-year cohorts. For the women born between 1931 and 1940, the off-spring sex ratio falls monoton-
ically with maternal education, from 1.10 for the least educated mothers to 1.05 for college-educated
mothers. The relationship between mother’s education and offspring sex ratio remains negative for
the cohort born in the next decade (1941 to 1950), but is substantially flatter. Finally, the relation-
ship has flipped for the cohort born between 1951 and 1960. The least educated bore 1.04 sons per
daughters whereas mothers with a college degree or more had borne 1.12 sons per daughter. Using
father’s education instead of mother’s as a measure of parental status provides similar results.19
The timing of the changes is also consistent with the story offered by the model. The majority
of the 1931-1940 cohort bore their children in the 1950s to the early 1970s. Since the country was
much poorer then than it is today and there were no public transfer programs available, it is likely
that economic considerations played a major role in determining whether to favor sons or daughters,
and that this motive was particularly strong for poorer families. On the other hand, the majority of
the youngest cohort gave birth to their children from the early 1970s to the mid 1990s. During these
two and half decades, per capita income increased by 13 times and major social welfare programs
were established. Thus, the 1951-60 birth cohort was perhaps the first generation who anticipated
that means of old-age security other than the support of children would be available to them.
The Korean data show not a u-shaped but a negative relationship between sex ratio and maternal
education for the earliest cohort, mothers born 1931-1940 (and were between 15-45 years of age
between 1945-1985). Over time, fertility patterns have also changed. While more educated mothers
have fewer children, the gradient has become less pronounce, Table A-1.
A simple, albeit ad hoc, modification that would bring the model (roughly) in line with these
stylized facts would be to allow parents to have many children. For simplicity, let us maintain the
assumption that parents can have at most one married child, but allow any number of unmarried
18For example, whereas the overall sex ratio in Korea was 117.2 in 1990, the sex ratio of the third-parity children
was 195.9, and those of fourth- and fifth-parity children were 234.4 and 228.8, respectively.
19The offspring sex ratio of the least educated fathers fell from 1.085 for the 1931-1940 cohort to 1.056 for the
1951-1960 cohort, whereas the ratio of sons to daughters of the college-educated fathers increased from 1.065 for the
1931-1940 cohort to 1.132 for the 1951-1060 cohort.
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children. Since men are more productive than women, these non-reproductives would be male.
Moreover, let each child bring additional consumption in old age, at a constant non-monetary cost.
From decreasing marginal utility of consumption, it is straightforward to see that lower income
parents would choose higher fertility. If sufficiently strong, maleness of offspring could decline
with mother’s social status in the cross section (save for the very top that would always be male).
Development would bring a decline in fertility across the board until only married children are
chosen, eliminating fertility differences across mothers of different socio-economic status.
3.2 Marriage Market Influences on Sex Ratios at Birth
Our model hinges on the assumption that parents take their children’s marriage market prospects
into account when evaluating respective benefits of sons and daughters. To investigate this premise,
we examine the relationship between the sex ratio at birth in a locality and the male-to-female ratio
of the population aged 20 to 29 old residing in that locality.
To that end, we construct a county/district-level cross-sectional data set from various micro
data pertaining to variables on sex ratios at birth and their correlates. First, sex ratios at birth in
each county/district were computed from the micro data on the 2005 Vital Statistics for Birth and
Death. Second, the sex ratio of the population aged 20 to 29 and the fraction of the population with
a particular religion (Buddhists, Protestants, and Catholics) in each locality were drawn from the
2% sample of the 2005 Census. Finally, the average earning of employed residents in each locality
aged 20 to 55 were calculated from the micro data on the 2005 Occupational Employment Structure
Survey (OES). There were 327 counties and districts in 2005. Of these localities, 249 were selected
based on the following criteria: first, the total number of births was 100 or more (253 counties and
districts satisfy this condition), and second, the variables on the sex ratio of younger adults, religion,
and earnings, as measured by male earnings, drawn from Census and OES are all complete.20
The following four variables are employed as indices of sex ratios at birth: (1) the overall sex
ratio, (2) the sex ratio of second- or higher-parity births, (3) the sex ratio of children born to high-
education mothers (those with college education or higher), and (4) the sex ratio of children born
to low-education mothers (those with high school education or lower). Since discrimination against
girls has been found to be particularly pronounced at higher parity and absent sons, e.g., Das Gupta
[1987], Zeng et al. [1993], Jha et al. [2006], Almond and Edlund [2008], the relationship between the
20While it would be useful to look into the male and female earnings separately, the relatively modest sample size
of the OES (about 60,000 employees in total) makes it difficult to estimate average earnings in each county/districts
for females.
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sex ratio and marriage market condition, if any, could be more strongly revealed for higher-parity
births.21 The third and fourth variables are considered to examine if the relationship between off-
spring sex ratio and marriage market prospect differs by parental status. With non-random marriage
market matching, sons of poorer parents would be more vulnerable to an aggregate shortage of brides,
which may make poorer parents’s sex choice more sensitive to the local sex ration.
Figure 7 plots the relationship between these four sex ratios at birth and the male-to-female
ratio of the residents at marriageable age in each locality. The overall sex ratio at birth is negatively
related to the sex ratio of young adults, indicating that parents are less likely to choose sons in
localities where marriage-market prospect for males is poorer. This negative relationship stands out
more clearly if the sex ratio at birth for second- and higher-parity births is concerned, top right panel.
For highly-educated mothers, the local marriage-market condition does not appear to matter much
in choosing offspring gender, lower left panel. For low-education mothers, in contrast, a stronger
influence of marriage market condition on sex ratio at birth is observed, lower right panel.
3.2.1 Regression Results
Clearly, the local adult sex ratio is only one predictor of a son’s future marriage market. For instance,
as mentioned, rural men have felt the marriage market squeeze more acutely. We therefore turn
to regression analysis. Using our county-level data, we estimate by OLS the following regression
equation:
ratioOi = ratio2029i + ln yi + xi + ²i,
where i subscript indicates the county (or district), ratioOi is the sex ratio at birth, ratio2029i is
the sex ratio of 20-29 year olds, and ln yi is the log of average earnings in the county. These latter
two variables are indicators of marriage market conditions, where we expect a higher sex ratio and
lower earnings to lower the sex ratio at birth.
We also include the fraction who are Christians in the county, xi, to capture possible religious or
cultural influences on son preference and attitudes toward abortion. Chung [2007] found Christians
to be significantly less likely to have use induced abortion to screen out girls in her analysis of the
2000 Korea National Fertility and Family Health Survey, a finding echoed in Almond et al. [2009]’s
study of Asian immigrants to Canada using the 2001 Canadian Census. The log of earnings of
21Although the overall sex ratio at birth has recently returned to a normal level in Korea (106.1 in 2007), the
son-to-daughter ratio for the third or higher parity births remains still high (115.7 in 2007).
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employed workers is included to capture economic conditions in the locality.
The results are reported in Table 1. Adding the Christian share and the average male earnings,
the overall relationship between sex ratios at birth and the index of marriage-market condition,
presented in Figure 7, remains largely unchanged.
The ratio2029i is negatively related to the overall sex ratio at birth (column 1). The sex ratios
of second- and higher-parity births (column 2) and of those with low-education mothers (column
4) are more strongly influenced by this measure of marriage-market condition. In fact, for college
educated mothers, the effect is positive, albeit marginally insignificant, (column 3). Our model
suggests a rationale for why low and high education mothers would exhibit opposite effects: any
parent who choose a daughter instead of a son, will allow another parent’s son to marry. A reason
the poor would be the first to make the switch to daughters is that they are the ones most at risk
of having their son not marrying at all in case of an overall surplus of sons.
The effect of log average earnings mirrors those of the adult sex ratio: low education mothers
seem particularly affected and in the expected direction – low earnings depress the sex ratio at birth.
That low education mothers’ offspring sex choice would be particularly sensitive to adverse male
marriage market conditions is consistent with the Korean experience where men in agriculture and
fishery – men who are both in poor areas and in low earning occupations – have had particular
difficulty finding wives, as well as studies of studies of internal migration patterns in China [Fan and
Huang, 1998] and the Western Industrialized world [Edlund, 2005].
It is interesting that high sex ratio of 20-29 year olds depresses sex ratios at birth.22 One reason
this might be case is that this sex ratio reflects the economic status of the area [Fan and Huang,
1998, Edlund, 2005] . Parents in poor areas may foresee greater problems for their sons in the
marriage market than for daughters. Alternatively, our finding may be related to how marriage
market information filters through to parental decisions. From a marriage squeeze perspective, the
relevant sex ratios to watch if parents were concerned with their child’s marriage market prospects
would be those of much younger cohorts. However, as the more than ten years of rising sex ratios
in Korea (and 20 years and counting in China), suggest, while the marriage market consequences
of unbalanced sex ratios may be perfectly predictable in the aggregate, the extent to which this
information filters through to individual decisions may be less than perfect.
Finally, Christianity exerts a strong negative effect on sex ratio, in line with previous findings of
Chung [2007], Almond et al. [2009].23
22In preliminary analysis, we did not find effects for the sex ratio for the 10-19 or the 30-39 age groups.
23If the share of Buddhists is included as a covariate, it has a strong positive effect on sex ratios at birth, but does
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4 Summary and Discussion
We have provided a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of economic development on
parental sex choice when sons are culturally prized and children provide old age support. Two key
assumptions drive our model. First, the cultural valuation of children vary not only with gender but
also with marital status. In particular, while a married son is preferred to a married daughter, the
latter is preferred to an unmarried son. Second, we assume that parents of higher social standing
are more likely to be able to marry their son than parents of low status. We use the model to
trace out predictions for how sex ratios would vary over time and cross sectionally with economic
development. We have also presented corroborative evidence data from South Korea. Korea shares
with India and China a strong patriarchal culture favoring sons, and a recent past of poverty. Korea
went from being a poor developing country in the 1960s to joining the OECD in 1996.
Explicitly allowing for parents to care about consumption and thus the earnings ability of their
children net of marriage transfers (if any) provides a framework for analyzing the likely impact
of development without positing that it acts on cultural motives for son preference. Economic
development, in our model, directly influences choices by lowering the valuation of consumption at
the margin, which lowers parental valuation of higher earnings potential of sons over daughters, and
raises the willingness to pay to have a married son. The higher bride price further contributes to
making a married daughter a more attractive option compared to an unmarried son.
There are of course other avenues through which development may reduce the material advantage
of sons. With less emphasis on physical strength and lower desired fertility, the earnings gender gap is
closing. Moreover, with the adoption of more individualistic values, parents’ claim on their children’s
labor may be lessened (possibly facilitated by growing importance of wage work).
In Korea, the sex ratios at birth peaked at 1.17 in 1993 but have since returned to normal.
In line with our model’s prediction, as Korea grew more aﬄuent, not only did sex ratios decline,
but the relationship between parental status and offspring sex ratios turned increasingly positive.
The return to normal sex ratios in Korea has been welcomed and taken as an indication that sex
selective abortion is a problem of the past. In July 2008, South Korea’s top court overturned a ban
on revealing sex of unborn babies, in place since 1987. Our finds suggest that while development
may bring balances sex ratios, sex choice may still be practised to the detriment of girls.
Moreover, we find, in the cross-section, that marriage market conditions have a bearing on
parents’ sex choice using vital statistics and census data from 2005. Poor counties, or counties with
not change our main results.
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a high sex ratio among adults 20-29, had lower sex ratios at birth, suggesting that current marriage
market conditions may impact the decision of whether to have a girl or a boy. If correct, this finding
suggests that policy interventions may be welfare improving (reducing the cycles resulting from over
and undershooting).
The role of the marriage market in tempering the proclivity to select sons may also contribute
to the understanding of the recent findings of high offspring sex ratios among Asian immigrants in
a number of Western countries [Dubuc and Coleman, 2007, Almond and Edlund, 2008, Abrevaya,
2009, Almond et al., 2009] – being of high socio-economic status and forming minorities in their
host countries, these groups can run a significant deficit of females without compromising their sons’
ability to marry.
A number of studies have documented a positive relationship between parental socio-economic
status and offspring sex ratio. However, absent deliberate sex choice, the relationship is typically
much muted (see Almond and Edlund [2007] and references therein). This paper’s empirical findings
stand out by their effect size, illustrating the predictive power of sex choice models [Trivers and
Willard, 1973, Edlund, 1999] in environments where parents consciously choose the sex of offspring.
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Source: 2009 Projected Population in Korea; Drawn from the website of Korean Statistical Infor-
mation Service (http://www.kosis.kr).
Note: According to the Chinese zodiac, children born in the year of the Horse (12-year cycle) are
independent and rebellious, characters considered particularly troublesome in daughters. Every 60
years, the year of the Fire Horse, these traits are exaggerated. The dates of the last Fire Horse
occurred 21 January 1966 - 8 February 1967.
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Source: 2% micro samples of the 1985, 1995 and 2005 Korean Censuses.
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Source: Vital Statistics of Korea: Marriage and Divorce, each year; Drawn from the website of
Korean Statistical Information Service (http://www.kosis.kr).
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Source: 2% micro sample of the 2005 Korean Census.
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Source: Micro sample of the 2005 Vital Statistics of Korea: Birth; and 2% micro sample of the 2005
Korean Census.
Note: County or district with 100 or more births (249 in total).
27
Appendix
Table A-1: Completed fertility by maternal education and cohort
Parental Education
Birth Year Primary or less Middle High College or higher
1931-1940 4.339 3.604 3.215 2.919
1941-1950 3.456 2.811 2.547 2.326
1951-1960 2.551 2.199 2.017 1.928
Source: Korean 2005 Census, 2% micro sample.
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Overall sex ratio 
(Mean=1.081) 
(2) 




Sex ratio of children born to 




Sex ratio of children born to 
low-educated mothers 
without college education 
(Mean=1.077) 
Parameter P-value Parameter P-value Parameter P-value Parameter P-value 
Intercept  1.0125 <.0001 1.1260 <.0001 1.1537 <.0001 0.9270 <.0001 
Sex ratio of population 20 to 29 1.020 -0.0450 0.0284 -0.0939 0.0023 0.0470 0.1646 -0.0721 0.0063 
Proportion of Christians 0.254 -0.1920 0.0032 -0.3178 0.0011 -0.1388 0.1936 -0.2595 0.0019 
Log of average earnings 5.209 0.0312 0.1829 0.0315 0.3673 -0.0139 0.7196 0.0555 0.0656 
 R-square = 0.0456 
F-value = 3.90  
(P-value = 0.0095)  
R-square = 0.0638 
F-value = 5.56 
(P-value = 0.0010) 
R-square = 0.0252 
F-value = 2.11 
(P-value = 0.0991) 
R-square = 0.0602 
F-value = 5.23 
(P-value = 0.0016) 
Note: The number of observations is 249. 
Source: Measures of sex ratios (dependent variables) were computed from the 2005 Vital Statistics for Birth and Death; the sex ratio of the population aged 20 to 29 and 
the proportion of the resident whose religion is Christianity (either Protestant or Catholic) from the 2005 Population and Housing Census; and the average earnings from 
the 2005 Industrial and Occupational Employment Structure Survey.  
 
